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WHY THE DEBATE ON RESTRICTING HEALTH CARE
WORKERS WITH HIV SHOULD END: A RESPONSE TO
PROFESSOR CLOSEN
MARC E. ELOVlTZ*

I. INTRODUCTION
Professor Closen's article is eighty-three pages long, with four
hundred forty-eight footnotes.
To respond to Professor Closen's
contentions point by point would require a substantial number of pages
and footnotes. That is not the response I have written because I do not
think it necessary; in fact, I think it dangerous.
Implicit in Professor Closen's article, and in the Symposium itself, is
the idea that the issue of restrictions on health care workers with HIV is
a legitimate subject of debate about which reasonable minds may differ.
I disagree. Because there is no evidence to support the existence of a
significant risk of transmission of HIV to patients, there is no real basis
for dispute. Continuing to engage in this debate is not a harmless
diversion, nor even just a waste of resources; rather, it furthers
discrimination against health care workers with HIV.
By its very
existence, the debate lends credence to the view that special employment
restrictions are justified-and unjustifiably positions freedom from these
restrictions at an extreme.
During the Symposium I called upon proponents of restrictions to
justify those restrictions. I no longer believe that is enough. I now
propose that those who would debate the issue, from either side, must be
called on to justify the debate itself.

II. THE CONTEXT
In the Spring of 1996, I was asked to participate in the Symposium,
Job Restrictions and Disclosure Requirements for HIV-Infected Health
Care Professionals,1 at New York Law School. Because a frequent
proponent of such restrictions, Professor Michael Closen, was scheduled
* Former Staff Counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union's AIDS Project from
1993-1996. He has been a member of the AIDS Committee of the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York since 1993. He is a 1986 honors graduate of Wesleyan
University and a 1990 graduate of New York University School of Law, where he was
an editor of the Review of Law and Social Change.
1. Symposium, Job Restrictions and Disclosure Requirements for HIV-Infected
Health Care Professionals:Whose Privacy Is It Anyway?, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 5
(1996).
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to speak, I felt an obligation to attend and present the opposing
viewpoint. As it turned out, on the day of the Symposium I discovered
that the other two panelists-Dr. Norton Spritz, Chief of the Medical
Service at the New York Veterans Administration Medical Center, and
Kathryn Meyer, Senior Vice-President for Legal Affairs and General
Counsel of the Beth Israel Medical Center-shared my basic views. Thus,
three of us spoke against special restrictions on health care workers
(HCWs) with HIV and one in favor. I tried to confront Professor Closen
with the lack of evidence of transmission and the significance of this in
light of the mandate of federal non-discrimination laws requiring fair
treatment of people with HIV.2 He replied-as he and other proponents
of restrictions have in the past-that because HIV could theoretically be
transmitted to patients, the government's interest in non-discrimination is
trumped.' I left the Symposium feeling satisfied that I had done a decent
job and that both sides of the debate had been presented. Shortly after,
I was told that the Symposium transcript would be published and that
Professor Closen would be submitting a full-length article to accompany
it. Again, I felt an obligation to respond, concerned that the back-andforth of the debate captured in the transcript would not be a sufficient
response to an entire article from the opposing point of view.
When I began drafting a point-by-point response to Professor Closen's
article, however, it occurred to me that there is nothing new to say. The
issue of restrictions on HCWs with HIV is far from novel. The
bibliography of legal articles addressing this issue is vast.4 There is no
2. Id. at 30-32.
3. Id. at 25-30.
4. Barbara Matthews Anderson, "FirstDo No Harm .
": Can Restrictions on
HIV-Infected Health Care Workers Be Justified?, 33 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 603 (1993);
Mark Barnes et al., The HIV-Infected Health CareProfessional:Employment Policiesand
Public Health, 18 LAw MED. & HEALTH CARE 311 (1990); Mary Anne Bobinski, Risk
and Rationality: The Centersfor Disease Control and the Regulation of HIV-Infected
Health Care Workers, 36 ST. Louis U. L.J. 213 (1991); Edward N. Brandt, Health Care
Workers and AIDS, 48 MD. L. REV. 1 (1989); Michael L. Closen, A Callfor Mandatory
HIV Testing and Restriction of CertainHealth Care Professionals,9 ST. Louis U. PUB.
L. REv. 421 (1990); Kenneth A. DeVille, Nothing to FearBut FearItself: HIV-Infected
Physicians and the Law of Informed Consent, 22 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 163 (1994);

Steven Eisenstat, The HIV Infected Health Care Worker: The New AIDS Scapegoat, 44
RUTGERS L. REV. 301 (1992); Chai R. Feldblum, A Response to Gostin, "The HIV-

Infected Health Care Professional:Public Policy, Discrimination,and Patient Safety,"
19 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 134 (1991); Lois Frankel, Commentary: AIDS Testing
of Health Care Workers, 16 NoVA L. REv. 1161 (1992); Larry Gostin, The HIV-Infected
Health Care Professional:Public Policy, Discriminationand Patient Safety, 18 LAW
MED. & HEALTH CARE 303 (1990); Lawrence Gostin, CDC Guidelines on HIV or HBVPositive Health CareProfessionalsPerformingExposure-ProneInvasive Procedures,19
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LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 140 (1991); Lawrence Gostin, HIV-Infected Physiciansand
the Practiceof Seriously Invasive Procedures,HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb. 1989,
at 32; Donald H.J. Hermann, Commentary: A Callfor Authoritative CDCGuidelinesfor
HIV-Infected Health Care Workers, 22 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 176 (1994); Scott H.
Isaacman, The Other Side of the Coin: HIV-Infected Health Care Workers, 9 ST. Louis
U. PUB. L. REv. 439 (1990); Gordon G. Keyes, Health-CareProfessionalswith AIDS:
The Risk of Transmission BalancedAgainstthe Interests of ProfessionalsandInstitutions,
16 J.C. & U.L. 589 (1990); Theodore R. LeBlang, Obligationsof HIV-Infected Health
Professionals to Inform Patients of Their Serological Status: Evolving Theories of
Liability, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 317 (1994); Karen C. Lieberman & Arthur R.
Derse, M.D., HIV-Positive Health Care Workers and the Obligation to Disclose, 13 J.
LEGAL MED. 333 (1992); Mary K. Logan, Who's Afraid of Whom? CourtsRequire HIVInfected Doctors to Obtain Informed Consent of Patients, 44 DEPAUL L. REv. 483
(1995); Janice K. Lunde, Informed Consent and the HIV-Positive Physician, 38 MED.
TRIAL TECH. Q. 186 (1991); Donald J. McNeil & Laurie A. Spieler, Mandatory Testing
of Hospital Employees Exposed to the AIDS Virus: Need to Know or Unwarranted
Invasion of Privacy?, 21 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 1039 (1990); Sandra L. Mitchell,
Employment Issues FacingH1-Infected Health Care Workers, 3 J. PHARMACY & L. 5
(1993-1994); Brenda S. Reid, HIV in the Health Care Workplace: ChallengesInvolving
HPV-Infected Employees and Physicians, 14 WHITTIER L. REv. 24 (1993); Reed E.
Schaper, HIV in the Health Care Workplace: Challenges Involving HP/-Infected
Employees and Physicians, 14 WHITTIER L. REv. 33 (1993); Wm. Clark Stanton, H/V
in the Health Care Workplace: Challenges Involving HP/-Infected Employees and
Physicians, 14 WHITTIER L. REV. 15 (1993); Patricia S. Atkins, Note, The Constitutional
Implications ofMandatoryAIDS Testing in the Health Care Industry, 17 Sw. U. L. REv.
787 (1988); Jane H. Barney, Comment, A Health Care Worker's Duty to Undergo
Routine Testing for HIV/AIDS and to Disclose Positive Results to Patients, 52 LA. L.
REv. 933 (1992); Arthur J. Becker, Jr., Comment, The Competing Interests in HIV
Disclosurefor Infected Health Care Workers: The Judicialand Legislative Responses, 97
DICK. L. REv. 777 (1993); P. Dean Brinkley, Comment, Health Care Worker's Legal
Duty to DiscloseHIV-Positive Status to PatientsBefore PerformingInvasive Procedures,
29 TULSA L.J. 429 (1993); Stacey Turner Caldwell, Casenote, Discrimination or
Protection of the Public: An Examination of Estate of Behringer v. Medical Center at
Princeton, 14 GEO. MASON L. REv. 469 (1991); Jeffery W. Cavender, Note, AIDS in
the Health Care Setting: The CongressionalResponseto the Kimberly Bergalis Case, 26
GA. L. REv. 539 (1992); Susan L. DiMaggio, Note, State Regulations and the HIVPositive Health Care Professional:A Response to a Problem That Does Not Exist, 19
AM. J.L. & MED. 497 (1993); Vallori K. Hard, Comment, Mandatory Disclosure of
AIDS Status by Health Care Workers, 21 W. ST. U. L. REv. 295 (1993); Jennifer Hertz,
Comment, Physicians With AIDS: A Proposalfor Efficient Disclosure, 59 U. CHI. L.
REv. 749 (1992); Mark D. Johnson, Comment, HV Testing of Health Care Workers:
Conflict Between the Common Law and the Centersfor Disease Control, 42 AM. U. L.
REV. 479 (1993); Thomas E. Margolis, Commentary, Health Care Workers andAIDS,
13 J. LEGAL MED. 357 (1992); Joel Neugarten, Note, The Americans With Disabilities
Act: Magic Bullet or Band-Aidfor Patientsand Health Care Workers Infected with the
Human Immunodeficiency Virus?, 57 BROOK. L. REv. 1277 (1992); R. Bradley Prewitt,
Comment, The "Direct Threat" Approach to the HIV-Positive Health Care Employee
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new medical or scientific information supporting restrictions on health care
workers. Indeed, not one documented case exists where a patient
contracted HIV from a health care worker.' The only medical news is
that, with all of the HCWs with HIV continuing in their employment,
there continues to be no evidence of transmission. And, as for the courts,
little is up for discussion. The courts continue, as they have for several
years, to uphold employment discrimination against people with HIV
despite the lack of evidence of its transmission. 6 These courts have
disregarded the non-discrimination mandate of the disability rights statutes,
relying instead on fear of the perceived fatality of HIV and the fact that
scientists cannot say that HIV transmission from HCW to patient could
never happen. 7

Under the ADA, 62 MIss. L.J. 719 (1993).
5. Studies of the HIV status of patients of HCWs with HIV show that not one case
of transmission to a patient has been documented. See Laurie M. Robert et al.,
Investigations of Patients of Health Care Workers Infected with HIV, 122 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED., 653, 653-57 (1995).
While there is one widely reported case of
possible transmission, the Centers for Disease Control has not been able to
establish-despite extensive investigation-how, or even if, that case involved
transmission from a dentist to several of his patients. Id.
6. Doe v. University of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261 (4th Cir. 1995);
Bradley v. University of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 3 F.3d 922 (5th Cir. 1993);
Mauro v. Borgess Med. Ctr., 886 F. Supp. 1349 (W.D. Mich. 1995); Scoles v. Mercy
Health Corp., 887 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Doe v. Washington Univ., 780 F.
Supp. 628 (E.D. Mo. 1991); Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs, 714 F. Supp. 1377 (E.D.
La. 1989), aff'd, 909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990); Estate ofBehringer v. Medical Ctr., 592
A.2d 1251 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991); In re Milton S. Hershey Med. Ctr., 595
A.2d 1290 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991), aff'd, 634 A.2d 159 (Pa. 1992).
7. The Supreme Court has noted that "[flew aspects of a handicap give rise to the
same level of public fear and misapprehension as contagiousness." School Bd. v. Arline,
480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987). See, e.g., Bradley, 3 F.3d at 922 (stating that although the
risk of HIV transmission from doctor to patient may be "exceedingly low," it is
nevertheless real); Doe, 780 F. Supp. at 633 (granting summary judgment in favor of
dental school that disenrolled an HIV infected student because of the risk of HIV
transmission from student to patient during invasive procedures); Leckelt, 714 F. Supp.
at 1377 (concluding that although the probability of an HCW transmitting HIV to a
patient may be extremely low, no cure exists for HIV or AIDS, and the potential harm
of infection is extremely high); Hershey, 595 A.2d at 1290 (affirming trial court's order
that physician disclose his identity after physician exposed HIV-positive blood to patient;
court reasoned that disclosure was necessary because HIV is infectious and full-blown
AIDS is always fatal).

19961

WHY THE DEBATE SHOULD END
III. PROFESSOR CLOSEN'S ARTICLE

Because there is nothing new to say about restrictions on HCWs with
HIV, I think it is useful to look at exactly what Professor Closen does say
in his article. The article is built upon an erroneous assumption about the
likelihood of transmitting HIV from HCW to patient. Professor Closen
justifies restrictions on HCWs with HIV based only on the theoretical risk
of transmission. He claims that "numerous patients" have been infected
even though not one documented case exists. He repeatedly cites one
court's unfounded assumption that a "staggering" number of patients have
been infected.9 And in one of the least explicable passages of the article,
Professor Closen seems to suggest that barbers present a risk of HIV
transmission, citing no less a medical authority than conservative Judge
Richard Posner." When it comes right down to it, Professor Closen
relies on the assumption that because he can imagine transmission from
HCWs to patients it must occur." His only proofs are models and
estimates of transmission built upon that assumption.' 2
To back up this faulty view of the likelihood of transmission,
Professor Closen cites public opinion polls and federal court rulings
showing that people are afraid that HIV can be transmitted from HCWs
8. The fact that there are no documented cases of transmission does not prove that
transmission could never happen in a health care setting where universal precautions are
used; rather, it shows that the risk is extremely low. Professor Closen's example of a
documented case of transmission of HIV by biting in 1994 does not mean that it had been
wrong to say that the risk of transmission by biting is very low. See Michael L. Closen,
HIV-AIDS Infected Surgeons and Dentists and the Medical Profession'sBetrayal of Its
Responsibility to Patients, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 57, 79-80. The important question
is whether we shape policy based on extraordinarily rare circumstances. For example,
does Professor Closen believe that the single biting case means that the thousands of
children with HIV in this country should be kept out of school? After all, Closen
apparently believes that HCWs with HIV should be forced out of their jobs based on an
assumption of transmission that has not even been born out by a documented case. See
id.

9. Id. at 80 n.99.
10. See id. at 97 n.234.
11. He repeatedly lays out a chain of causation that seems to makes sense: an HIVinfected surgeon cuts himself with a sharp instrument, and then bleeds into the patient's
body. See id. at 58 n.2, 65 n.36. But this imagined scenario ignores infection control
procedures, such as gloves and blunt-ended instruments that break the chain, as well as
the difficulty of connecting sufficient quantities of a surgeon's blood with a patient's
blood to result in transmission of the virus.
12. See id. at 61 n.20, 62 n.24.
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and want to avoid this possibility.' 3 He cites data that eighty to ninety
percent of people polled want mandatory testing of HCWs. 14 But since
when do we decide cases based on popular vote? 5 Incredibly, he relies
on public opinion to justify restrictions on HCWs with HIV, yet when
public opinion goes too far even for him, he says that it should not be
followed. 6 Professor Closen offers no explanation as to how to
determine when law by popular vote will be followed and when the public
will be dismissed as "not ...well informed and precise."17
Professor Closen also touts the "twenty-five to thirty state and federal
trial and appellate judges" who have upheld restrictions against HCWs
with HIV.' 8 But, since when do we decide whether cases are properly
decided by counting the number of judges who voted a certain way? If
Professor Closen is interested in counting judges,p he might consider the
number of Supreme Court Justices who held that unfounded fears of
transmission of tuberculosis did not justify discrimination against a
schoolteacher. 19
In addition to exaggerating the likelihood of transmission, Professor
Closen entirely avoids discussion of the non-discrimination mandate, 20
in
which context the issue of restrictions on HCWs with HIV arises.
People with HIV, including HCWs, are covered by non-discrimination
laws that prevent unequal treatment without justification.2' Professor
Closen assumes that any risk of transmission-no matter how small or
theoretical-provides a justification for discrimination against HCWs with
HIV. This type of thinking is exactly why disability non-discrimination
laws are so important: to ensure that the treatment of people with
13. His discussion of public opinion is not a mere aside-he includes an entire
section titled "Public Opinion." Id. at 97.
14. See id. at 97 n.235.
15. But see ROBERTH. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH (1996) (proposing
popular votes following court rulings).

16. See Closen, supra note 8, 97 n.235 (advocating limited testing of HCWs
although the public supports testing of all HCWs).

17. Id.
18. Id. at 88-89.
19. See School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 275 (1987) (If he were so inclined,
Professor Closen would count seven: Brennan, J., delivered the opinion, and White,
Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor, JJ., joined.).
20. See Closen, supra note 8, at 64 n.32.
21. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994);
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-97 (1990).
22. See Closen, supra note 8, at 65.
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disabilities is based on facts, not the fears and stereotypes that have
traditionally limited their opportunities.
Professor Closen's discussion of HCWs with HIV is framed in terms
of an arrogant and powerful group-health care workers-putting their
egos and profits ahead of the safety of their patients.'
According to
Professor Closen, there is a "conspiracy of silence" among medical
professionals in which "patients are viewed to be expendable" by doctors
with "runaway egos."24 But despite the hyperbole, HCWs with HIV are
not a good illustration of the medical establishment's abuse of power.
Unlike the researchers in Tuskegee, repeatedly cited in the article as
analogous,' HCWs with HIV who follow universal infection26 control
precautions do not subject patients to a significant risk of harm.
Professor Closen devotes a significant part of the article to explaining
how a wide range of legal claims might be made with regard to HCWs
with HIV.27 He discusses medical malpractice, negligence, intentional
tort claims that allow punitive damages (claims such as battery, fraud,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and breach of fiduciary duty or
implied contract), and criminal charges.28 Professor Closen addresses
these theories in detail, finding-not surprisingly-that they each offer
grounds for recovery against a HCW with HIV.29 He calls, as he has
elsewhere,30 for mandatory testing of HCWs and notes that "[t]he public
opinion data... show that such measures would be quite popular with the
public. " " He also calls for "sizable" punitive damages awards for
plaintiffs in these cases to punish and to deter other HCWs from
committing "such abuses."32
Professor Closen does not just write about such cases-he also brings
them. In his article, he discloses that he has brought a class action suit on
behalf of HIV-negative people who were treated by a dental student with
23. See id. at 59, 72, 81, 103-04.
24. Id. at 116-17.
25. See id. at 62.
26. In addition, a strong social policy reason exists for HCWs not to disclose their
HIV status-the unfounded but pervasive fears of the public that would significantly
harm, if not destroy, their careers.
27. See Closen, supra note 8, at 122-23.
28. See id.

29. See id.
30. See Michael L. Closen, A Call for Mandatory HIV Testing and Restriction of
Certain Health Care Professionals,9 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 421 (1990).
31. Closen, supra note 8, at 133.
32. Id. at 132.
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3
HIVy.
The patients sought money damages based on the patients' fear
that they might have been infected by the student.' Closen makes much
of their suffering: "Imagine the feelings of shock, anger, frustration,
despair and betrayal."" The greater the fear, the greater the suffering
and the greater the money damages award will be. It is not surprising
then, that Professor Closen's article maintains that the risk of transmission
36
is significant and that fears of such transmission are reasonable.

IV. THE DEBATE

The debate in which Professor Closen engages, both in his article and
in his litigation, is not a new one. Because there is no new evidence
showing a risk of transmission greater than that which we have known for
several years, the important point to address is why we keep this debate
going. We support the status quo-discrimination against HCWs with
HIV-by engaging in debate that implies that there are reasonable grounds
for dispute. There has never been a justification for discriminating against
HCWs with HIV, but unfortunately, that fact is overshadowed by our
continued debate over whether or not such discrimination is justified.
Meanwhile, year after year, discrimination against HCWs with HIV has
continued and courts have upheld such discrimination with a view to
playing it safe while the debate goes on.
For example, the court in one case upheld a policy restricting HCWs
with HIV on the basis that "[rleasonable persons professing knowledge of
the subject matter may differ as to whether there is 'any' risk involved in
an invasive surgical procedure by a surgeon carrying [HIV]. " 37
Similarly, Professor Closen writes:
If we assume that at least some of the medical experts on each
side of the fight are capable, qualified, and rational, it would
appear the ultimate conclusion to be drawn for the time being is
that reasonable medical experts are uncertain about the extent of
danger of HIV transmission to patients.3"

33. See id. at 60, 129, 132, 138.
34. See id. at 132.

35. Id. at 91.
36. See id. at 132-33.
37. Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251, 1277 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1991).
38. Closen, supra note 8, at 104-05.
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First, I do not assume the capability, qualifications or rationality of
medical experts who support restrictions on HCWs with -IV.3 9 Even
more importantly, I do not conclude that there is a "relevant" degree of
uncertainty as to the danger of transmission. A theoretical risk which a
doctor might note does not constitute a "significant risk" for purposes of
non-discrimination laws. In other words, just because we can never say
that something with a theoretical risk will never happen does not mean
that this risk justifies the destruction of careers.
Another way that the debate skews understanding of this issue is the
argument that because a "reasonable" disagreement over the likelihood of
transmission continues, some middle ground or compromise position as to
restrictions should be reached. For Professor Closen, the reasonable
compromise is to restrict HCWs who perform procedures he considers
invasive. 4 Others view lesser or greater restrictions as a reasonable
compromise, 41 but the question should be why a compromise is sought
when no evidence supports restrictions at all.
The ongoing debate has ramifications beyond the issue of HCWs with
HIV. For example, in Weeks v. State,42 a ninety-nine year sentence for
attempted murder was upheld on the notion that HIV could be transmitted
by spitting, even though such transmission is only a "theoretical
possibility" and has never happened.43 In Abbott v. Bragdon," a
dentist argues that he should be allowed to refuse treatment to a patient
with HIV because of the risk that the patient will transmit the virus to
him.4

The debate promotes unreasonable fears of transmission-fears that
are encouraged and exacerbated by money damages claims for recovery
based on those fears. Fearing liability, hospitals sometimes try to err on
39. For example, one of the "experts" who testified whether HIV can be transmitted
by spitting was a non-medical doctor who "resigned from the American Psychological
Association to avoid charges of his unethical conduct as a psychologist," and who a
federal judge in another case found had "made misrepresentation to this Court" in his
capacity as an "expert" witness. Baker v. Wade, 106 F.R.D. 526, 536-37 n.31 (N.D.
Tex. 1985). Despite his lack of credentials and his history, the court in Weeks v. State
accepted his testimony that HIV could be transmitted. 834 S.W.2d 559, 562-63 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1992, pet. refd).
40. Closen, supra note 8, at 104-05.
41. See, e.g., Barnes et al., supra note 4; Eisenstat, supra note 4. But see, e.g.,
Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991).

42. 834 S.W.2d 559.
43. Id. at 563.
44. 912 F. Supp. 580 (D. Me. 1995), appealdocketed, No. 96-1643 (1st Cir. May

13, 1996).
45. Id. at 587.
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the safe side by restricting practice by HCWs with HIV and by sending
letters warning patients who have been treated by HCWs with HIV.
Professor Closen criticizes hospitals for setting policies about HCWs with
HIV without informing patients,' but he ignores the fact that the fear of
liability drives this practice.
By exaggerating the fear of transmission from HCW to patient, the
debate encourages discrimination against HCWs with HIV, as well as
against HCWs who are perceived to have HIV or to be at a greater risk
of having HIV. Again, Professor Closen encourages such discrimination
with his fear-based money damages suits. In one case Professor Closen
is litigating, the plaintiff class alleges that the defendant dental student
should have warned his patients that he was sexually active with other
men.47 Does this mean that all HCWs should warn their patients if they
have sex, or only gay men? What about a heterosexual woman who
suspects her husband of using intravenous drugs, or of having sex with
men-must she warn her patients of these possibilities? If Professor
Closen believes in giving patients as much information as he says he does,
and he believes that information about a HCW's HIV-risk activities is
relevant to patients, then where would he draw the line? Would HCWs
be required to tell all potential patients about any behavior that could
possibly lead to HIV infection? No matter how likely that the disclosure
would subject them to unjustified discrimination? These extreme results,
mandated by Professor Closen's arguments, show the broad-ranging
effects of the skewed debate on HCWs with HIV.
V. CONCLUSION

Readers looking for a detailed explanation of why special restrictions
on HCWs with HIV are not justified should look elsewhere. 48 The point
of this response is that the detailed explanation has already been made,
and no new evidence exists to change it. Continuing to debate the issue
presents a skewed version of the facts to the public, the courts, and
ourselves. I therefore respond to Professor Closen's article, and the
Symposium for which it was written, with a call that we consider the
debate itself. Perhaps then, we will realize the way it supports the status
quo of discrimination and the even broader harms it engenders.

46. See Closen, supra note 8, at 58 n.2.
47. See id. at 120-21.
48. See, e.g., Ad Hoc Comm. on AIDS, Association of the Bar of the City of N.Y.,
HIV-Infected Health Care Workers and Employment DiscriminationLaw, 51 REcoRD 246
(1996), reprinted in 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 151 (1996); Anderson, supra note 4;
Eisenstat, supra note 4; McNeil & Spieler, supra note 4.

